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INTRODUCTION 35
Creativity is a mysterious and complex phenomenon thought to be capital of the human mind. It has 36 shown to be hard to objectify and quantify, which has hampered mechanistic approaches of creativity. 37 Yet, despite its complexity, it can be seen as an ability requiring both originality and effectiveness 38 (Runco & Jaeger, 2012) . The construct of creativity is thought to comprise two measurable cognitive 39 ingredients that are crucial to the creative processes everyone experiences on a daily basis: divergent 40 and convergent thinking (Guilford, 1967) . Divergent thinking represents a style of thinking that allows 41 idea generation, in a context where the selection criteria are relatively vague and more than one 42 solution is correct. Divergent thinking, therefore, involves flexibility of the mind. In contrast, 43 convergent thinking represents a style of thinking that allows finding single solutions to a 44 well-defined problem, which requires more persistence and focus (Guilford, 1950; Runco, 2010) . 45 Interestingly, one could potentially distinguish the two processes in earlier models on stages of 46 creative processes. For example, almost a century ago, Wallas (1926) suggested that creative acts run 47 through four stages including (1) preparation: the problem is investigated;
(2) incubation: the 48 problem is thought about unconsciously; (3) illumination: ideas come together to form a possible 49 solution; and (4) verification: the chosen option is evaluated. It makes sense to characterize the first 50 two stages as relying more on divergent thinking and the last two stages as relying more on 51 convergent thinking. 52
Considering the different characteristics of divergent and convergent thinking and the different 53 roles they play at the stages of creative production, it makes sense to assume that the two thinking 54 styles rely on different functional and neural mechanisms (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; 55 Dietrich, 2004) . Unfortunately, however, research on creativity has often considered creativity as one 56 coherent concept that relies on one coherent ability that can be assessed by means of 57 comprehensive, unitary questionnaires or tasks that lump together separable, presumably rather 58 different components-which does not seem to do sufficient justice to the underlying mechanics. 59
Even studies that did not equate the two thinking styles have focused exclusively on either divergent 60 tasks (for overviews and discussion, see Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008 ; Davis, 2009) or convergent 61 tasks (e.g., Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987) , providing a rather fragmented, non-comprehensive 62 view on creativity mechanisms. And yet, multiple findings support the assumption of critical 63 differences between divergent and convergent thinking. In particular, divergent and convergent 64 thinking could be demonstrated to be (1) inducing different, or even opposite, mood states (Akbari 65
Chermahini & Hommel, 2012a); (2) associated with different metacontrol states (Hommel, 2015) ; (3)  66 differently related to the neuromodulatory dopamine system in the brain (Akbari Chermahini & 67 Hommel, 2010) ; and (4) differently influenced by behavioral interventions such as meditation 68 (Colzato, Ozturk, & Hommel, 2012; Colzato, Szapora, Lippelt, & Hommel, 2014) . 69 Even though these and other observations point to important differences between divergent and 70 convergent thinking, there are also some indications of similarities. For instance, whereas individual 71 measures of performance in divergent and convergent thinking tasks have been reported to be 72 uncorrelated in a study of European participants (Akbari Chermahini & Hommel, 2010), significant 73 positive correlations between the two measurements were found in Chinese participants (Shen, 74 Hommel, Yuan, Chang, & Zhang, 2018). Moreover, a recent explorative open-label study on 75 microdosing psilocybin, known to influence serotonin receptors in the brain, indicated that both 76 divergent and convergent thinking processes increase after taking microdoses of psilocybin 77 (Prochazkova et al., 2018) . Similarly, it was found that convergent and divergent thinking do share 78 similarities in neural patterns, especially in increased alpha band activity as measured with 79 electroencephalography (EEG) (Jung-Beeman, 2004; ). 80
To summarize, divergent and convergent thinking are subcomponents of creativity that show 81 both similarities and differences that are far from being understood (Mekern, Hommel, & Sjoerds, 82 2019a; Sternberg, Kaufman, & Pretz, 2013) . The current, subcomponent-indifferent approach, and 83 the lack of understanding on differences and similarities between the two, severely limits our 84 opportunities to systematically study and effectively enhance human creativity. The purpose of the 85 present narrative review is to provide an overview and a theoretical integration of what is known in 86 the literature about similarities and differences between convergent and divergent thinking. We see 87
this as an important first step, before looking further into more detailed computational processes 88 that could more readily be connected to neural correlates, and further improve our knowledge on 89 creative mechanisms. We will discuss the similarities and differences between divergent and 90 convergent thinking in the context of both behavioral and neuroimaging findings, to give further 91 leverage to studying and understanding more detailed underlying neurocognitive mechanisms of the 92 complex construct of creativity. The theoretical integration that we suggest is based on the 93 assumption that divergent and convergent thinking rely on systematic differences in the underlying 94 metacontrol state (Hommel, 2017) , that is, on the general information-processing mode that the 95 thinking individual establishes in order to carry out divergent-or convergent-thinking tasks. In the 96 following, we will first explain what a metacontrol state is and how it may relate to divergent and 97 convergent thinking in terms of functional characteristics, neuromodulation, and brain areas involved. 98
Then we will briefly discuss how divergent and convergent thinking can be measured, and on which 99 particular tasks our review will focus, before we review the behavioral and neuronal key findings 100 related to divergent and convergent thinking. 101 102
METACONTROL OF DIVERGENT AND CONVERGENT THINKING 103
Given that divergent and convergent thinking are likely to serve different purposes and to satisfy 104 different task demands, it is important to characterize these two thinking styles in more detail. To 105 account for these differences, the Dual Pathway to Creativity (DPC) Model (Nijstad, De Dreu, 106 Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010) has been proposed. The model distinguishes between a flexibility route and 107 a persistence route to creative performance, and it assumes that creative products and even different 108 measures in the same creativity task may rely on these two routes to different degrees. To create a 109 highly original idea or product, flexibility is needed to switch between different and remote 110 associations to find a better idea or solution (Vartanian, 2009 ), but persistence is also required to 111 focus on the task at hand and to find the final solution (De Dreu et al., 2012). The two routes can thus 112 be assumed to be collaborated differently in divergent and convergent thinking: the flexibility route 113 may dominate in divergent thinking, and in particular when switching between different categories, 114
whereas the persistence route may dominate in convergent thinking or in producing different items 115 of the same category in divergent thinking ( Figure 1 ). 116 
125
The idea that behavior emerges from a balance between persistence and flexibility is also key to 126 the Metacontrol State Model (MSM; Hommel, 2015), a model that was conceived to account for 127 cognitive control in general, but that can be easily applied to creativity and convergent and divergent 128 thinking as well. The MSM is used to describe the balance between persistence and flexibility in any 129 kind of decision-making, which the model assumes (following Bogacz, 2007) to be competitive 130 (winner-takes-all) and biased according to currently active goals (see competition and top-down bias 131
in Figure 2 , respectively). If, thus, two or more goal-related representations compete for selection 132 (indicated by mutual inhibition), increases in activation of a better alternative reduces the activation 133 of the other. The degree to which alternatives compete and to which they are biased by current goals 134 is determined by the present metacontrol state, which varies between persistence and flexibility. 135
Extreme persistence would consist in strong mutual competition as well as top-down bias, whereas 136 extreme flexibility would consist in weak competition and weak top-down bias. Accordingly, 137 convergent thinking would be expected to rely on, or at least benefit from, a bias towards persistence, 138
whereas divergent thinking should rely on, or benefit from, a bias towards flexibility (Hommel, 2015; 139 Hommel & Colzato, 2017b; Mekern, Hommel, & Sjoerds, 2019b). 140
The DPC and the MSM model differ in focus and emphasis, but they are highly consistent for the 141 most part and both relate to dopaminergic activity. In particular, striatal dopamine and the integrity 142 of the nigrostriatal dopamine pathway has been assumed to be associated with flexible processing, 143
and prefrontal dopamine and the integrity of the mesocortical dopaminergic pathway with persistent 144 processing (Boot 
154
Empirical findings support the idea that divergent and convergent thinking are related to 155 flexibility and persistence, respectively. The link between divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility 156 receives support from the observation that positive mood, which is assumed to support flexibility 157 ( Other findings provide support for a link between convergent thinking and cognitive persistence. 182
For instance, working memory performance, which is related to executive function and involvement 183 of the prefrontal cortex, could predict convergent thinking but not divergent thinking (Lee & 184 Therriault, 2013). Moreover, engaging in convergent thinking was found to induce negative mood 185 (Akbrai Chermahini & Hommel, 2012a), which in turn is suspected to narrowing the focus of attention 186 (Rowe, Hirsh, & Anderson, 2006 ; but see Bruyneel et al., 2013). Along similar lines, convergent 187 thinking benefits from focused-attention meditation, which is assumed to induce a metacontrol bias 188 towards persistence (Colzato et al., 2012) , and from bilingualism, which is expected to do the same 189 (Hommel, Colzato, Fischer, & Christoffels, 2011) . In addition, engaging in convergent thinking task was 190 found to increase top-down control and reduce cross-talk in an overlapping dual-task (Fischer & 191 Hommel, 2012 Colzato, 2017b, which we briefly summarize here). In a nutshell, there is increasing evidence from 198 neuroscientific analyses and behavioral genetics that creative cognition is a function of dopaminergic 199 modulation in fronto-striatal brain circuitries, and that persistence as well as flexibility in creative 200 cognition are modulated by prefrontal dopamine and striatal dopamine, respectively. More 201 specifically, findings suggest that the mesocortical dopaminergic pathway that originates in the 202 ventral tegmental area (VTA) and innervates the prefrontal cortex (Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, 1992), is 203 fueling cognitive persistence. It is less clear whether this is because the mesocortical dopaminergic 204 pathway is driving prefrontal cortex as a whole (e.g. Cools, 2008) or whether it mainly drives 205 dopaminergic D1 family receptors that dominate, but are not restricted to prefrontal cortex 206 (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008) . The same logic applies to the striatal dopaminergic pathway that 207 originates in the Substantia Nigra and was found to promote cognitive flexibility: this may be because 208 the pathway drive striatal processing as a whole or because it drives dopaminergic D2 family 209 receptors that dominate, but are not restricted to the striatum. 210
This share of labor is consistent with findings from behavioral genetics, which show that 211 individuals with a genetic predisposition for particularly efficient dopaminergic processing in 212 prefrontal areas excel in persistence-heavy tasks whereas individuals with a genetic predisposition for 213 efficient dopaminergic processing in the striatum excel in flexibility-heavy tasks ( In addition to dopamine, one may speculate that norepinephrine might also play a role in 223 regulating human creativity. More specifically, the locus coeruleus-norepinephrine (LC-NE) 224 neuromodulatory system has been proposed to regulate the balance between exploitation and 225 exploration (Beversdorf, 2019; Lin & Vartanian, 2018), a trade-off which shares many characteristics 226 with the opposition between persistence and flexibility. However, at this point the role of 227 norepinephrine is much less clear than that of dopamine. 228
Taken altogether, the available evidence strongly suggests that frontal and striatal dopaminergic 229 pathways play an important role in human creativity by regulating cognitive persistence and flexibility. 230
However, we currently know much more about the neurotransmitters that are driving creative 231 processes through metacontrol than about the cortical structures that are being driven by them. To 232 improve this situation, we asked, in case dopamine, and perhaps noradrenaline, are the fuel of 233 regulating creativity, which areas are fueled by them? After a brief discussion of the conceptual 234 distinction between convergent and divergent thinking, and their possible relationship to metacontrol, 235
we will thus consider which cortical structures might be involved in regulating human creativity, 236
possibly through metacontrol states, and how they might interact in order to achieve that. 237 238
ASSESSING DIVERGENT AND CONVERGENT THINKING 239
Divergent thinking represents a type of thinking that allows many new ideas being generated, in a 240
context where more than one solution is correct. Guilford's (1967) Alternative Uses Task (AUT) is 241 currently most used to measure people's divergent thinking ability: participants are presented with a 242 particular object, such as a brick, and they are to generate as many different uses of this object as 243 possible. Classically, four indicators are used to evaluate AUT performance: fluency (the total number 244 of ideas generated); flexibility (the number of categories or themes used by the participants); 245 elaboration (the amount of detail provided); and originality (the extent to which responses are 246 unique compared to the rest of the sample, or population). Note that these four measures assess 247 different aspects of the performance and they differ in theoretical transparency. Fluency and 248 elaboration are not particularly qualified nor specific to creativity (e.g., fluency will be high for 249
participants who repeat similar versions of the same concept over and over again), and likely to be 250 particularly sensitive to the participant's general vocabulary and motivation. Originality, in contrast, is 251 essential for creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012) , but this measure has the disadvantage of being 252 dependent on the particular sample: uniqueness is commonly assessed with respect to the current 253 sample under analysis, so that the same performance of a given individual would count less if he or 254
she would happen to have particularly original fellow participants, an issue that classically arises 255 when studying 'creative' populations such as artists. This leaves flexibility as the theoretically most 256 transparent measure, as it qualifies sheer production, as assessed by dividing the amount of 257 generated ideas through the number of different categories being used.
258
A task such as the AUT would be expected to require rather weak top-down support, as the 259 search criterion is rather vague, and given that many answers are possible and correct, the 260 competition between alternatives should also be weak. This means that performance in this task 261 would strongly benefit from a control mode that is biased towards flexibility (Hommel, 2015 Convergent thinking is considered a process of generating one possible solution to a particular, 269
well-defined problem. Mednick's (1962) Remote Associates Test (RAT) fits this profile, and is therefore 270 most commonly used in the convergent thinking literature: participants are presented with three 271 unrelated words, such as "cocktail," "dress," and "birthday," and are to identify the common associate 272
("party"). The total number of correct answers is used to evaluate one's convergent thinking level. 273
This task provides more and rather tight top-down constraints, and there is only one possible answer 274
per item, suggesting that the task calls for a control state with a strong impact of the goal -a bias 275 toward persistence (Hommel, 2015) . Compared with other convergent tasks like color categorization 276 (Gibson, Folley, & Park, 2009) , color matching task (Folley & Park, 2005) , word ends task (Fink, 277 Grabner, et al., 2009) and mental arithmetic (Razoumnikova, 2000) , RAT is thought to involve more 278 creativity-specific processes (Gabora, 2016) . The RAT requires participants to hold one target word as 279 a primary cue and to subsequently think of other related associations. Therefore, it is likely that, in 280 contrast to what is commonly assumed, the RAT might also involve aspects of divergent thinking and, 281 thus, benefit from some degree of flexibility (Olteţeanu & Falomir, 2015) . In this review, we mainly 282 focus on the RAT as the measurement used for convergent thinking. 283
A recent methodological innovation concerning the RAT has been introduced by Kounios through insight is often accompanied by a certain lack of focus, it stands to reason that the process 291 underlying insight is more similar to divergent thinking than analytical search would be. Indeed, 292
neural evidence showed that insight solutions do share similarities with the divergent thinking 293 process. For example, in the RAT, during the preparation periods followed by insight solutions, alpha 294 synchronization is seen in the right hemisphere, which is similar to neural patterns seen in divergent 295 thinking, whereas analytical solutions during the RAT were associated with alpha desynchronization 296 (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Runco & Yoruk, 2014). However, this regards the preparation period, and 297 it is so far not yet fully understood how the actual finding of insight solution relates to divergent 298 thinking as assessed by the AUT, and thus more empirical evidence is needed. 299 300
In any case, these characterizations of divergent and convergent thinking, and the measures 301 used to assess them, reveal that neither AUT nor RAT can be assumed to represent process-pure 302 measures of divergent and convergent thinking or the underlying processes (cf., Nijstad et al., 2010) . 303
While it is certainly true that the AUT requires more divergent thinking than the RAT, which in turn 304 requires more convergent thinking than the AUT, we need to keep in mind that in both tasks 305 participants are required to hold one goal-related concept while switching between other possible or 306 actual alternatives (Mekern et al., 2019a) . Therefore, the two tasks, as well as the alternatives that 307
have been used, are likely to overlap to a substantial degree and need both divergent and convergent 308 thinking and, thus, both flexibility and persistence (Nijstad et al., 2010) . One way to better 309 disentangle divergent and convergent thinking is to better characterize and identify the functional 310 and neural mechanisms underlying these processes, to which we will now turn. 311 312
NEURAL CORRELATES OF DIVERGENT AND CONVERGENT THINKING 313
In recent years, a couple of articles have provided reviews regarding some neuroscientific aspects of 314 creativity in general or divergent or convergent thinking in particular, some with an emphasis on the 315 neural structures being involved (e.g., Dietrich With respect to the neural aspects that we will focus on in the following, three cortical areas 327
have repeatedly been indicated in variants of divergent-and/or convergent-thinking performance: 328 the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and overall the 329 right hemisphere, with the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) and closely related areas in particular. 330
Highlighting these areas involved in divergent and convergent thinking implies a discrete localization 331 point-of-view, attributing compound cognitive constructs such as 'convergent' and 'divergent' 332 thinking to discrete topographical brain 'areas'. Although this point-of-view is outdated, it is still 333 adopted in the bulk of the neurocognitive literature, including much of the literature we review here. 334 We will attempt to overcome this, by connecting subprocesses to activation patterns in these areas, 335
and by providing a theoretical integration of the broader neural circuits that might work together to 336 generate divergent and convergent behavior. As we will argue in the following sections, the degree of 337 activation of left IFG and DLPFC, and the alpha power related to the right PPC and related areas seem 338 to be systematically related to the different types of creative thinking (divergent and convergent), 339
suggesting that a broad network with these three areas as core hubs serves to implement different 340 metacontrol policies. 341 342
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus (IFG) and left Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 343
The left IFG has been both found activated in the AUT and during insight trials of the RAT in fMRI 344 studies. of left DLPFC facilitates convergent thinking performance somewhat more reliably than divergent 400 thinking (Zmigrod, Colzato, & Hommel, 2015) . This can be connected back to metacontrol, as 401 persistence, which requires participants to keep on the goal of the task, is related to working memory 402 and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003) . Interestingly, cognitive 403 flexibility, which is related to the activation of the left IFG (Chávez-Eakle et al., 2007) , has been found 404 to be associated with the deactivation of the DLPFC in patients with bipolar disorder, who performed 405 a simple motor response flexibility task (Nelson et al., 2007) . 406
In conclusion, the left IFG and DLPFC are both active in divergent and convergent thinking, but 407 they seem to have opposite activation dynamics and facilitate different types of the creative thinking. 408
The left IFG, which has been found mostly activated (or more strongly activated than right IFG: 409
Mayseless & Shamay-Tsoory, 2015) in divergent-thinking and other cognitive flexibility task, might 410 implement metacontrol flexibility, while the activated left DLPFC might implement persistence, which 411 helps in convergent thinking but hinders in flexibility tasks. 412 413 THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE 414
In EEG studies of divergent and convergent thinking, changes in alpha synchronization (Pfurtscheller 415 & Lopes da Silva, 1999) have often been observed. While overall increased alpha synchronization was 416 found during both divergent and convergent thinking tasks (Benedek, Bergner, Könen, Fink, & 417 Neubauer, 2011), alpha synchronization was found to be particularly strong in the right hemisphere 418 during divergent thinking tasks (for a review: Runco & Yoruk, 2014) . Specifically, during AUT 419 performance, participants who scored higher on originality showed higher alpha synchronization in 420 the right posterior parietal cortex compared to their lower scoring counterparts (Fink, Grabner, et al., 421 2009 ). In line with this, compared with deliberate mind wandering, which requires more cognitive 422 control, participants with higher rates of spontaneous mind wandering, thought to reflect a more 423 flexible state, showed cortical thinning in the regions of the right parietal cortex (Golchert et al., 2017) 
424
-together this suggests that structural changes in the right parietal cortex might also be an indicator 425 of flexibility. 426
In the RAT, alpha power in this specific region was also increased in the preparation period of 427 insight trials specifically ( trials of the RAT (specifically during the preparation period), stronger alpha desynchronization in the 436 occipital cortex was found compared than in insight trials (Kounios et al., 2006) . 437
The emerging pattern of stronger alpha synchronization in areas of the right hemisphere during 438 more flexibility-heavy tasks, like divergent thinking or insight solutions in convergent tasks, and alpha 439 desynchronization in these structures during persistence-heavy, convergent tasks might seem to be 440 inconsistent with the available evidence from fMRI studies that, as we will see, rather systematically 441
show weaker activation of right-hemisphere structures in flexibility-heavy tasks than in 442 persistence-heavy tasks. But first, we need to consider that the alpha frequency band is the lowest 443 that the human brain exhibits, which means that entraining neural firing patterns to synchronize at 444 the lowest frequency band possible reduces the average neural activity in the synchronized brain 445
systems. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that the alpha band power synchronization is 446 negatively correlated with BOLD signals in the corresponding brain areas (Scheeringa et al., 2011; 447 Scheeringa, Koopmans, van Mourik, Jensen, & Norris, 2016). Hence, from the reviewed EEG studies, 448 one would expect lower BOLD activation in right-hemisphere structures in flexibility-heavy tasks than 449 in persistence-heavy tasks. 450
Indeed, the AUT induced weaker activations in the right than in the left angular gyrus, and this 451 asymmetry was more pronounced than in object characteristic tasks (Fink, Grabner, et al., 2009 ). The 452 angular gyrus is located in the parietal lobe and close to the superior temporal gyrus (STG), and the 453 weaker activation seen in the right angular gyrus is thus consistent with reported increase of alpha 454 synchronization in the posterior parietal cortex of the right hemisphere as seen in EEG studies (Fink, 455 Grabner, et al., 2009; Kounios et al., 2006) . During the preparation period of insight trials in the RAT, 456
the STG also showed stronger activation in the left than the right hemisphere (Kounios et al., 2006) . 457
The angular gyrus and the STG are located very close to each other, and are thought of being part of a 458 memory-related network (Chávez-Eakle et al., 2007; Seghier, 2013). In flexibility-heavy creative 459 thinking, areas in the memory-related network of the right hemisphere exhibit a weaker and more 460 diffuse activation state, which is thought to facilitate the (re-)combination of semantic information 461 that is normally distantly related (Jung-Beeman, 2005), which in turn is crucial in AUT performance. 462
Note that this fits the suggestion that alpha synchronization might facilitate the (re-)combination of 463 distantly related semantic associations (Fink, Graif, & Neubauer, 2009 ). Accordingly, we suggest that 464 metacontrol flexibility is characterized by increased alpha synchronization and weaker BOLD signals in 465 the relevant structures of the right hemisphere. As one would expect from this perspective, 466 convergent thinking was found to be associated with the exact opposite pattern: alpha 467 desynchronization and stronger right hemisphere activation. For instance, alpha desynchronization 468 has been found during analytic thinking (Kounios et al., 2006) . Even more interestingly, the left STG is 469 more strongly activated during the preparation period (during this period participants might be 470 searching for distantly semantic associations in memory) of insight (Kounios et al., 2006) , but at the 471 moment when the insight occurs (i.e., when participants find the correct solution in the RAT), the 472 right STG is more strongly activated (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004). This suggests that insight solutions 473 are characterized by a (perhaps spontaneously established) flexibility-biased metacontrol state at the 474 beginning of a trial that turns into a persistence bias produced by the finding of the solution. 475
In conclusion, the right PPC and/or STG (and sometimes parts of the occipital lobe) seem to be 476 systematically affected by metacontrol policies: tasks or particular intervals of trials that rely on 477 metacontrol flexibility are associated with stronger alpha synchronization and weaker BOLD signals in 478 right-hemispheric brain structures, whereas tasks or intervals that rely on persistence are associated 479 with alpha desynchronization and stronger BOLD signals in right-hemispheric brain structures. Alpha 480 synchronization and weaker BOLD in these structures seem to be associated with a broader scope of 481 the semantic search. As considered by Runco and Yoruk (2014) , divergent thinking such as in the AUT 482 might lead the participant to use some superficial representations of the object cue, so that for 483 instance a tin can would be represented by its primary association of being made of tin. This would 484 be represented in the corresponding working-memory structure in the left hemisphere, which in turn 485 would steer the search for secondary semantic or episodic associations, for which structures in the 486 right hemisphere would play an important role (Jung-Beeman, 2005) . This search should not be 487 particularly selective but rather broad, and thus benefit from the weak activation of a broader areas 488 (Runco & Yoruk, 2014) . As mentioned already, this hypothesis was indeed supported by the 489 observation of stronger alpha synchronization in the right hemisphere in participants who exhibited 490 high originality scores in the AUT ( We thus tentatively conclude that the two observed activation patterns (lIFG+, lDLPC-, 513 rPPC/rSTG-vs. lIFG-, lDLPC+, rPPC/rSTG+) represent examples of metacontrol states that are biased 514 towards flexibility and persistence, respectively (see Figure 3 ). Assuming that flexibility and 515 persistence represent the two poles of a continuous metacontrol dimension, we thus assume that the 516 same holds for the observed activation patterns. That is, we speculate that left IFG and DLPFC and 517 corresponding right-hemispheric structures form a neural network that can vary continuously from 518 lIFG+, lDLPC-, rPPC/rSTG-to lIFG-, lDLPC+, rPPC/rSTG+ and, by doing so, serve to implement 519 metacontrol biases of different degrees towards flexibility and persistence, respectively. 520 521 522 523 would suggest that the metacontrol state can change throughout an insight trial (see Figure 4) : it 547 starts with a mixture of strong DLPFC involvement, presumably an indicator of multiple-constraints 548 tasks like the RAT (where the search template consists of three words rather than one word), and a 549 strongly activated IFG that indicates a flexibility bias, together with only weakly activated 550 right-hemispheric structures. But once the moment of insight is reached, the state of 551 right-hemispheric structures would rather look like strong persistence, at least with respect to the 552 focus on memory items. In other words, the right-hemispheric structures would tend to "zoom-in" 553 onto the result of the insight. This scenario has a number of suggestions that qualify our tentative 554 approach and identify critical questions that future research needs to address. 555
First, it implies that the interplay between left IFG and right-hemispheric structures might be 556 more essential for the establishment of flexibility in AUT than the degree to which DLPFC is activated. 557
Comparing Figures 3 and 4 reveals that the relationship between IFG and right-hemispheric activation  558 is more systematic than the relationship between either of these structures and DLPFC. It is true that 559 the post-insight part of Figure 4 does not quite fit this description, but for reasons that we spell out 560 below we think that this misfit is only apparent. This less systematic behavior of DLPFC is likely to 561 reflect that the degree to which it is activated during a task depends on its working-memory 562 demands. The activation of DLPFC is known to increase with the number or complexity of the content 563 it needs to hold, that is, on the working-memory demands of the task (Hussein, Johnston, Belbeck, 564
Lomber, & Everling, 2014). These demands are clearly higher in the RAT than in the AUT, as the 565 former requires holding three words and their related associations, while the latter requires holding 566 only one word. If, thus, DLPFC involvement increases with the number of cue words, a stronger 567 activation in the RAT may reflect the working-memory demands of this task rather than its 568 convergent nature. For this reason, we speculate that, at least with verbal material, the activation 569 relationship between IFG and right-hemispheric structures is more strongly related than the 570 relationship with DLPFC, which in turn might more depend on task-specific requirements unrelated to 571 metacontrol, such as verbal information. However, note that this does not necessarily imply the 572 absence of privileged communication between left DLPFC and right-hemispheric memory-related 573 structures. Gross of performing rather quick switches between flexibility and persistence-an idea that also fits with 584 the implication of the stage model of creativity suggested by Wallas (1926) . The scenario would also 585 suggest that such switches can occur spontaneously or driven by the results of information 586 processing. Studies on insight have revealed that the probability of solving a problem through 587 analytical hypothesis-testing or through insight can be predicted by the preparatory state, the 588 particular metacontrol bias we would argue, but so far it remains unclear when and why participants 589 establish particular preparatory states and why these states vary from trial to trial. This suggests that 590 metacontrol biases can undergo spontaneous drifts, so that different trials are carried out under 591 different flexibility or persistence biases. Further research is needed to identify possible predictors of 592 such drifts, which could be time on task, success in the previous trial, the search duration or difficulty 593 in the previous trial, and more. According to our scenario, changes in metacontrol bias may also be 594
driven by the results of information processing, so that the search for a solution could be broad, 595 facilitated by a flexibility bias, but once a solution is found, stronger persistence could set in to allow 596
for the processing to focus on the respective concept. Again, this would fit with the stage model 597 suggested by Wallas (1926) . However, further research is needed to understand whether and how 598 changes in metacontrol states are communicated to the relevant neural systems. 599 600 FUTURE RESEARCH 601
Our framework provides a guide to investigate the similarities and differences of divergent and 602 convergent thinking from a metacontrol perspective, which we feel can help organizing and 603
integrating future research efforts. First, neuroscientific studies, ideally combined with machine 604 learning or similar techniques, could aim to better characterize states of convergent and divergent 605 thinking on the one hand and states of persistence and flexibility on the other, so to validate the idea 606 that thinking styles and metacontrol are related. 607
Second, this could be done in studies with manipulations that are assumed to induce or promote 608 particular metacontrol styles, such as meditation (Hommel & Colzato, 2017a) or positive and negative 609 affect (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) to see whether and how these factors modify metacontrol and 610 thinking styles. 611
Third, it makes sense to regard our functional characterization of the key players in regulating 612 human creativity as an only intermediate step towards the development of a more mechanistic 613 computational model of creative cognition and the (meta)control thereof (Mekern et al., 2019a) . We 614 suspect that cognitive processes can be broken down into more to specific neural computations, 615
which can then be defined in the model as specific parameters. For instance, Mekern et al. (2019b)  616 have suggested that the balance between persistence and flexibility might be determined by a 617
parameter that regulates the degree to which decision-making is controlled by top-down, goal 618 -related settings and the strength of inhibition between alternative choices. This would provide us 619 with a model that can predict behavior on multiple creativity-like tasks-arguably one of the biggest 620 challenges in modern creativity research. 621
Fourth, the function of the right parietal cortex is still worth being more investigated. In our 622 framework, it might determine, together with the right STG, the size of the search field in long-term 623 memory. But it is important to consider that is adjacent to ECN (anterior inferior parietal cortex) and 624 DN (posterior inferior parietal cortex). As we know, alpha synchronization in this area implies internal 625 attention, but how this is related to different metacontrol state is still unclear. 626
Finally, it remains an open question whether, and how, norepinephrine is involved in the 627 regulation of human creativity, and whether or how it interacts with dopamine and, possibly, the 628 activities of the right parietal cortex. 629 630 631 CONCLUSION 632
Taken altogether, we suggest that creative cognition in divergent-and convergent-thinking tasks is 633 modulated by metacontrol states, where divergent thinking and insight solutions in 634 convergent-thinking tasks seem to rely on, or benefit from metacontrol biases towards flexibility, 635
whereas convergent, analytical thinking seems to rely on, or benefit from metacontrol biases towards 636 persistence. The particular metacontrol biases seem to be reflected by particular brain-activation 637 patterns, which, at least in the case of verbal materials, involves the left IFG and right-hemispheric 638 structures like PPC, STG, and/or occipital area. So far, the patterns showed rather systematic across 639 fMRI and EEG studies, but more specific analyses of neural communication in particular frequency 640 bands do not necessarily translate into particular BOLD patterns. We admit that our framework is 641 very tentative and much further research is needed to provide more details, but we do think it can 642 serve as a first proxy to guide such research into the mechanistic details of human creative cognition. 643 644
